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Summary: The countries of the former Yugoslavia inherited a diffi cult legacy of mass atrocities and human rights abuse from the wars of the 1990s. The European Union's association and accession conditionality with respect to Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia incorporates the problem of dealing with war crimes only insofar as it requires full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. While transfers of war crimes suspects to The Hague have dominated EU relations with the countries of the Western Balkans, domestic transitional justice mechanisms such as truth-telling inquiries and war crimes trials have been ignored by the international community. However, international justice remains both remote and heavily contested across the region, and is often used to radicalise nationalist sentiments instead of facilitating reconciliation among ethnic communities. The goals of EU conditionality in ex-Yugoslavia -promoting reconciliation and cross-border cooperation -can only be effectively advanced if mechanisms of transitional justice are employed at the national level, articulating truth and rebuilding the rule of law by establishing war crimes accountability from within.
The May 2005 decision by European Union foreign ministers to postpone accession talks with Croatia due to Zagreb's failure to hand over General Ante Gotovina to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) came as part of a wave of EU pressure for cooperation with the Tribunal across the former Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that Gotovina is now in The Hague, and governments have shown intensifi ed cooperation with the court, ICTY rhetoric continues to be widely rejected across the region. This paper analyses EU association and accession conditionality in the Western Balkans with respect to the legacy of mass atrocities inherited from the wars of the 1990s. First, it examines the current EU political conditionality in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has effectively reduced the war crimes issue to full cooperation with the ICTY. It then turns to the process of transitional justice in the region's post-confl ict societies, assess-ing its tensions and shortcomings. Finally, it argues that EU war crimes conditionality, by focusing exclusively on cooperation with the ICTY, has failed to facilitate the process of rebuilding the rule of law in the former Yugoslavia and to advance the goals of international justice: defusing ethnic tensions and promoting reconciliation in the region.
I. EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Political Criteria and the ICTY
The EU association and accession conditionality for the Western Balkan countries comprises two sets of criteria. The fi rst are the political, economic and institutional criteria established for all candidate countries by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993; the political criteria were defi ned as "[the] stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities".
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With the exception of "protection of minorities", the Treaty of Amsterdam confi rmed these criteria, incorporating them in Articles 6 and 49 of the Treaty on the European Union. Communication of 26 May 1999,   3 and includes, inter alia, full cooperation with the ICTY, respect for human and minority rights, the creation of real opportunities for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and a visible commitment to regional cooperation. 4 Cooperation with the ICTY has proved the most diffi cult issue in the SAP context, and has dominated the EU's external relations agenda with all three countries. The European Council, while affi rming that the future of the Western Balkans lies within the EU, has repeatedly insisted that progress towards association and eventual EU accession be conditioned on full cooperation with the ICTY.
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In its 2004 Annual Report on the SAP, the Commission concluded that cooperation with the ICTY by countries in the region had generally remained insuffi cient. 6 The closer a country moves towards opening accession negotiations, the greater the pressure on it to transfer indicted war crimes suspects to The Hague becomes, with ever more serious consequences for its failure to comply. showing Serbian soldiers killing Bosnian Muslims, the government announced plans to hand over Ratko MladiÊ and Radovan KaradžiÊ, the two men currently heading the ICTY's most-wanted list.
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Serbia desperately needs to demonstrate consistent compliance, as the Commission approved a Feasibility Report in May 2005 giving the green light to signing an SAA. 16 At the time of writing, the EU had terminated negotiations with the country pending the arrest of MladiÊ. Similarly, in its assessment of progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Commission declared that the requirement of full cooperation with the ICTY, particularly in the case of Republika Srpska, had to be met before it could recommend concluding an SAA.
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The External Relations Council reaffi rmed this position in January 2005.
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II. Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia
With EU conditionality focusing exclusively on cooperation with the ICTY, the wider process of transitional justice in the post-confl ict societies of former Yugoslavia has been largely ignored by the international community. Domestically, transitional justice has been characterised by a lack of genuine reckoning with the past and the widespread denial of atrocities committed on "our" side of the confl ict, as well as persistent ethnic bias in the administration of justice.
Despite differing institutional structures for dealing with the past and a differing balance of victims and perpetrators, there are some important features common to the process of transitional justice in all the post-confl ict countries of ex-Yugoslavia. Nowhere is the past confronted openly, in an inclusive process of truth-telling that would involve both state inquiries into the confl icts and personal accounts of them. Domestic war crimes trials fail to address the scale of the atrocities, while courts do not administer even-handed justice to war crimes suspects under their jurisdiction, without regard to ethnic and national affi liation. In this context, inter-ethnic and cross-border relations continue to be jeopardised by mutual grievances and tensions, diminishing the possibility for genuine reconciliation and cooperation across ethnic and national divides. 15 In its application, Bosnia requested that the Court declare that Yugoslavia, through its agents and surrogates, inter alia, had killed, illegally detained and exterminated citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, calling on it to immediately terminate the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and pay reparations. Croatia instituted similar genocide proceedings against Yugoslavia in 1999, seeking to establish liability for ethnic cleansing and extensive destruction of property.
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In their applications, both Bosnia and Croatia have also referred to alleged aggression by Yugoslavia in the course of the confl icts. Pending adjudication by the ICJ on the merits of these cases, the disputes articulated in international legal proceedings effectively preclude any constructive engagement by governments in the ex-Yugoslav countries, while contested narratives of genocide and aggression only serve to reinforce ethno-nationalist sentiments in the region.
B. Truth-Telling
Offi cial efforts aimed at truth-telling have notoriously failed in Serbia, largely because they were motivated by political expediency rather than a genuine will to revisit the past. The Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 2001 by a decision of thenPresident Vojislav Koštunica, 21 without public debate or consultation with Parliament. The commission's mandate was to address the causes of the confl icts, as opposed to uncovering new facts about hostilities and atrocities. 22 The lack of a minority representation, resignations by key members, and scarce resources added to the problems facing the TRC, which ultimately failed to disclose any new information, becoming both dysfunctional and irrelevant by 2003. low war criminals to go unpunished kept the idea of establishing such a body on the shelf despite years of deliberation.
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The only truth-telling initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the Commission for Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995 (the Srebrenica Commission), which was established by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska in December 2003. Following signifi cant pressure from High Representative Paddy Ashdown and the concurrent vetting of uncooperative offi cials, the Commission's October 2004 report admitted to the massacre of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995, disclosing the locations of 32 previously unknown mass graves. Arguably, this constitutes dramatic progress by the Bosnian Serbs towards acknowledging responsibility. Yet many in the Bosnian-Croat Federation have dismissed the Commission's work as the result of international pressure, without genuine remorse and concern for the victims, thus severely limiting its impact on reconciliation.
C. Domestic War Crimes Trials
National judiciaries in ex-Yugoslavia have dealt with the issue of war crimes rather reluctantly, failing to provide accountability for most of the atrocities or justice for the majority of the victims. Five years after the regime change, courts in Serbia have completed only a handful of trials, prosecuting mainly low-level paramilitaries and rank-and-fi le soldiers, while rejecting the doctrine of command responsibility in principle. A special War Crimes Chamber of the Belgrade District Court began its work in April 2004 with the OvËara case, concerning the massacre of 290 Croatian civilians captured in a Vukovar hospital in 1991. The success of this and future trials depends on tackling systemic problems such as a lack of adequate witness protection and insuffi cient vetting of offi cials in the police and judiciary, as well as the generally reluctant attitude of the public and the government alike. 24 Croatia has largely failed to deliver even-handed justice, despite the signifi cant number of war crimes cases processed by its courts. There has been a deluge of cases involving war crimes prosecutions of Serbs in absentia, compromising the rule of law through selectivity and bias. Bosnia's local justice record is even bleaker, as politicised judiciaries and ethnic bias preclude any accountability for war crimes. Thus Republika Srpska has conducted only two war crimes trials so far. which is expected to handle some of the backlog and deal with cases which might be transferred from the ICTY.
III. Limits of the EU's ICTY Conditionality
The EU's insistence on ICTY conditionality springs from a conviction that the Tribunal is a key factor in rebuilding the rule of law following armed confl ict in the Western Balkans, ending impunity for international crimes and facilitating reconciliation across the region.
27
As an exercise in international legalism, the ICTY was established with the promise of promoting peace by dismantling the ethno-nationalist ideologies which had been reinforced during the confl icts in ex-Yugoslavia. 28 An important aspect of the Tribunal's mandate was to punish those individuals who were most responsible for the atrocities, thereby precluding notions of collective responsibility and guilt by association. In this sense, the EU has adopted the view of many international lawyers that "judicialisation" of the truth about individual crimes and perpetrators, delivered in impartial proceedings at the international level, would challenge the region's collectivist ideologies, deter future confl ict, and facilitate reconciliation across ethnic divides.
ans. Beyond this "ethnic calculus", even moderates in Serbia perceive the fact that MiloševiÊ was prosecuted in The Hague, while other major villains of the wars, such as Croatia's Franjo Tudjman, were never indicted, as an attempt to distort the historical record of the last decade and put all the blame on the Serbian side. Instead of facilitating political transition and the process of rebuilding the rule of law by dealing with the past, the ICTY trials have been utilised by nationalist forces to demonstrate the persistent victimisation of Serbs and to radicalise Serbian politics.
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Distant and complex, the Tribunal's proceedings often fail to resonate with the local public or provide closure for the victims, even in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite its substantial jurisprudence concerning crimes against Bosnian Muslims, it was not until April 2004 that the ICTY Appeals Chamber confi rmed, in its judgment in the KrstiÊ case, that genocide had indeed been committed in Srebrenica in 1995.
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Some of the practices adopted by the Court, such as accepting guilty pleas or taking mitigating circumstances into account, have been condemned by organisations of victims and their families for compromising justice in the name of expediency. Thus, when the former co-president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Biljana PlavšiÊ, pleaded guilty, expressing her remorse and calling for reconciliation, the effect of her public apology on Bosnian Muslims was signifi cantly diminished by the plea bargain she had obtained and the lenient sentence that followed. 32 Finally, Croatia's uneasy cooperation with the Tribunal has produced little reconciliation with the past. The Croatian public's continued perception of convicted war criminals as heroes was made clear when Bosnian Croat general Tihomir BlaškiÊ returned to Croatia after being prosecuted by the ICTY for war crimes committed in Central Bosnia in 1993. Despite the fact that BlaškiÊ was cleared of most of the charges on appeal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber sentenced him to nine years imprisonment for abusing detainees.
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The time he had already served in custody was taken into account, allowing BlaškiÊ to return home shortly after judgment was rendered. His arrival at Zagreb Airport in August 2004 was greeted by euphoric crowds singing patriotic wartime hymns, and he was received with honours by the Croatian authorities. The status of a war hero was awarded to BlaškiÊ not because the most serious charges were dropped, but rather despite their being dropped. It is diffi cult to fi nd a better illustration of the widespread denial of ICTY rhetoric in Croatia and the limits of reconciliation in the region. 34 I have argued elsewhere that the ICTY's failure to aid post-confl ict societies in overcoming inter-ethnic distrust and nationalist politics derives from a tension between the liberal individualist bias of international law and the collectivist ideology of ethnic nationalism associated with mass atrocity in the former Yugoslavia. 35 Liberal international lawyers uphold individual agency and responsibility in an attempt to avoid collective responsibility and guilt by association, 36 thus prosecuting the top perpetrators and implicitly exonerating ethno-national communities. This international legal paradigm has been criticised for allowing its liberal bias to sideline ethnicity, as is evident in such choices as a "denationalised" bench, ethnic neutrality in handling evidentiary issues, and ignoring local calls for ethnic balance in the trials. 37 The nature of mass atrocity in an ethnic confl ict is, however, more collective than international criminal law is ready to admit. The war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide prosecuted by the ICTY were committed mainly by members of one ethnic group against individuals who were targeted precisely because they belonged to a rival ethnic group. 38 Crimes against humanity are, by defi nition, committed as part of an attack on a civilian population; 39 in the wars in former Yugoslavia, this meant attacking civilians from the enemy ethnic community. War crimes were often committed as part of larger campaigns of ethnic cleansing, hence the Tribunal's practice of prosecuting them as crimes against humanity as well. 40 Finally, the "group" nature of genocide has been codifi ed in the ICTY Statute itself, which requires the establishment of a special intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. 41 If the crimes prosecuted by the ICTY demonstrate a signifi cant collective dimension, their relation to the collectivist ideology of ethnic nationalism cannot be so easily avoided by a liberal insistence on individual criminal responsibility. The salience of group ethnicity in these confl icts persists across the former Yugoslavia, where ICTY proceedings are perceived locally not as punishing individuals, but as punishing the nation. Therefore, the goals of establishing the truth about mass atrocities and achieving closure and reconciliation across ethnic and national divides should also be pursued via transitional justice mechanisms at the national level, as these cannot be as easily rejected by the local public. Domestic truth-telling processes could play an important role in challenging denial by exposing the human dimension of atrocities and triggering shock and empathy with the victims, without risking a priori dismissal as illegitimate. Similarly, domestic war crimes trials could be effective in rebuilding the rule of law from within, since delivering justice counters a culture of impunity while allowing recognition of the victims' suffering where it matters most -in the very institutions that embody the perpetrator community as such.
Instead of using its leverage in the association and accession process to encourage the establishment of local tools for accountability, the EU has adopted an unnecessarily narrow understanding of transitional justice with respect to the former Yugoslavia. 42 By focusing exclusively on full cooperation with the ICTY, EU conditionality in the Western Balkans may have ignored domestic transitional justice to the detriment of its own purported goals: intensifi ed regional cooperation and respect for the rule of law. Furthermore, had domestic transitional justice processes taken root in each of the relevant countries, the ICTY's chances of fulfi lling its praiseworthy mandate of reconciliation would have been greater. Truthtelling and domestic justice may be the conditions which need to obtain fi rst in Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia in order for international justice to become locally relevant as intended.
IV. Conclusion
Rebuilding the rule of law in the countries of the former Yugoslavia is conditioned on dealing with the diffi cult legacy of the armed confl icts of the 1990s. The EU's conditionality with respect to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro has narrowly interpreted the Copenhagen political criteria in the SAP, focusing exclusively on full cooperation with the ICTY while ignoring domestic mechanisms for transitional justice. By excluding local truth-telling processes and war crimes trials from its association and accession conditionality, the EU has missed an important opportunity to encourage the region's governments and societies to acknowledge and deal with mass atrocities committed during the confl icts. Ignoring domestic transitional justice processes has allowed the persistence of ethno-nationalist ideologies and denial of responsibility for war crimes, thus obstructing both the process of rebuilding the rule of law and international justice's goal of facilitating lasting peace and reconciliation in the Western Balkans. As the ex-Yugoslav countries move closer to the Union, and the EU's leverage in negotiations increases, taking this lesson seriously might be the key to maximising the impact of EU conditionality as a positive force for transition in the region.
